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JIHADISM EXPANSION IN EGYPT AFTER 2011
ON THE EXAMPLE OF ANSAR BAYT AL-MAQDIS,
SINAI PROVINCE AND OTHER STRUCTURES
INTRODUCTION
The escalation of terrorist attacks in the Sinai Peninsula has gained wide-
spread interest of the international community in recent years. However, this 
is not a new phenomenon, but only a manifestation of long-term growth of 
the role of extremism, perceived by marginalised communities as part of the 
fight against state power.
We can differentiate four major periods in the history of the proliferation 
of jihadism on the territory of the Sinai Peninsula. The first of them covers 
the years 2004–2011 in which sporadic terrorist attacks occurred, although 
resulting in numerous victims. This phase ended with the outbreak of the 
‘Arab Spring’1, as a result of which – after the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak 
– the power was taken over by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF). Spectacular attacks gave way to smaller attacks on infrastructure 
targets. There was also an influx of terrorists through the Israeli-Egyptian 
border. The third period began in June 2012 after Muhammad Morsi, associ-
ated with the Muslim Brotherhood, was elected to the post of president. In 
August 2012 a military operation (Operation Sinai) was launched, resumed in 
1 Despite the disputes about the name itself, ‘Arab Spring’ commonly refers to mass 
demonstrations which started in December 2010 in Tunisia. In the majority of coun-
tries the situation remained at the level of protests and self-immolations, while in 
others the protests were accompanied by a change in the system of government. In 
some countries revolutions and civil wars broke out.
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mid-20132. At the same time concerns about the safety of the state authori-
ties increased, which was reflected in the assassination of General Mohamed 
el-Saeed, advisor of Interior Minister Mohammed Ibrahim, in January 20143. 
We have observed the last stage since the overthrow of President Moham-
med Mursi, that is since July 2013. In connection with the progressive per-
secution of Islamist groups, jihadism has begun to gain in importance, and 
groups identifying with this ideology and social movement have increased 
their operational capabilities, which is reflected in their increased activity 
outside the Sinai Peninsula.
Such an unstable situation requires constant enrichment of literature 
classifying the processes of destabilisation of the Middle East and describing 
regional armed conflicts, including interstate wars, internationalised internal 
conflicts and internal armed conflicts. The aim of the article is to present 
complex issues of expansion of jihadism in Egypt and its impact on the securi-
ty in the national and international dimension. Egyptian jihadists direct their 
attacks on public infrastructure and security forces, cooperating with local 
communities, mostly Bedouins, who have developed aversion to the authori-
ties because of many years of marginalisation4. However, the destabilisation 
of the state – located in a region where there is permanent destabilisation 
– also affects the security in the regional and global dimensions.
THE GENESIS OF EGYPTIAN JIHADISM
Several factors affect the growth of the attractiveness of Egypt as a suit-
able environment for the development of international jihadism. These 
include: poor control of security in border regions and insufficient security 
of movement of people across Egyptian borders, difficulties in the control of 
the Sinai Peninsula as well as long-standing policy of marginalisation of tribal 
communities by the state authorities.
2 Taha, H. 2016. Militarisation and security challenges in Egypt. In: Hokayem, E., 
Taha,  H. eds. Egypt after the Spring. Revolt and reaction. New York: Routledge, 
pp. 178 – 179.
3 Cunningham, E. 2014. Aide to Egypt’s interior minister killed; ousted president 
Morsi appears in court. The Washington Post 28 January 2014. Available at: https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/aide-to-interior-minister-killed-ousted-
egyptian-president-morsi-appears-in-court/2014/01/28/2773fbfe-8816-11e3-a5bd-
844629433ba3_story.html [Accessed: 25 June 2015].
4 Taha, H., op. cit. In: Hokayem, E., Taha, H. eds., op. cit., p. 180.
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The roots of Egyptian jihadism precede the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak, 
and later Mohammed Mursi. In fact jihadist activism in the Sinai Peninsula 
dates back to the early twenty-first century and is associated with the brutal 
suppression of all forms of terrorism by the Egyptian security forces. For 
decades, despite the activities of the Egyptian security forces, including the 
military intelligence forces (Mukhabarat el-Harbeya) tourists or international 
peacekeeping forces in the Sinai Peninsula have been periodically attacked 
by terrorists. Jihadism in Egypt has gained importance as a result of the 
marginalisation of tribal communities and their exclusion from development 
projects. Intensification of the attacks took place in 2004–2006, when a group 
of Bedouin and Palestinian militants carried out a series of high-profile attacks 
in the Red Sea resorts of Sharm el-Sheikh, Taba and Dahab, in which more 
than 120 people were killed and at least 350 were injured. After seven years, 
terrorism spectacularly returned to Egypt as a result of the massacre in Luxor 
which took place in November 19975. As a result of these attacks thousands of 
people were arrested, most of them were Bedouins. Services inflicted torture, 
even against women and children, which deepened the aversion of tribal com-
munities to the central authorities. In July 2005, there was another terrorist 
attack. In Sharm el-Sheikh 70 people were killed and 150 wounded. Al-Tawhid 
wa al-Jihad (TSJ)6 admitted to the attack, a group founded in 1997 by Khaled 
Mosa, Nasir Khamis el-Malahy and Salem Khedra el-Shanou, recruiting mem-
bers in local mosques. The success of the group, however, was short-lived. 
Ruthless repression by the Egyptian regime crushed the jihadists of the TSJ, 
killing the leaders in 2005 and 2006, and the group has de facto disintegrated7.
Over the next years relative peace prevailed in the Sinai Peninsula. This 
stabilisation turned out to be only temporary. At that time the Gaza Strip was 
the area of the development of Salafi jihadism which spread to neighbouring 
territories, primarily to the Sinai Peninsula. With the outbreak of the ‘Arab 
Spring’8 and the destabilisation of the region, new jihadi groups were created, 
5 On 17 November 1997 Muslim militants made an attack, killing 62 people, mostly 
foreign tourists at the entrance to the Temple of Hatshepsut in Luxor. The attack was 
probably carried out by Jemaah Islamiah, linked to al-Qaeda.
6 Alexandrani, I. 2015. Sinai: from revolution to terrorism. In: Rougier, B., Lacroix, 
S. eds. Egypt’s revolutions: politics, religion, and social movements. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 181–182.
7 Awad, M., Tadros, S. 2015. Bay’a remorse? Wilayat Sinai and the Nile Valley. Combat-
ing Terrorism Center at West Point, vol. 8, issue no. 8. Available at: https://www.ctc.usma.
edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/CTC Sentinel-Vol8Issue815.pdf, pp. 2–3.
8 More on 25 January 2011 revolution in Egypt in: Lipa, M. 2014. Arabska wiosna 
w Egipcie. Uwarunkowania, przebieg i skutki. [The Arab Spring in Egypt. Conditions, 
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among others,: Mujahideen Shura Council of Jerusalem, supporters of Jihad 
in the Sinai Peninsula, Soldiers of Allah or Ansar al-Sharia9.
Table 1
The leaders of Egypt in the years 1981–2015
Leader Term of office Post
Hosni Mubarak X 1981 – II 2011 President
Mohamed Hussein Tantawi II 2011 – VI 2012
The head of state as Chairman 
of the Supreme Council
of the Armed Forces
Muhammad Mursi VI 2012 – VII 2013 President
Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi 3–4 VII 2013 Supreme Commanderof the Armed Forces
Adli Mansur VII 2013 – VI 2014 Temporary president
Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi VI 2014 – President
Source: own study.
Despite this, a factor conditioning the spread of jihadism in Egypt was the 
fall of Mubarak’s regime in 2011. This event created chaos conductive to the 
increase of the role of jihadism. Fugitives who managed to escape from pris-
ons, as a result of the chaos after the overthrow of the president, joined the 
groups professing this ideology. They were joined in turn by foreign militants, 
penetrating the poorly protected Egyptian borders from unstable countries, 
such as Libya or Mali. In particular the Libyan crisis contributed to their 
inflow, it facilitated the smuggling of weapons and the influx of militants, 
allowing for collaboration between jihadist groups, including in the form of 
training of new radicals.
Thus, among the factors that contributed to the deterioration of security 
in the Sinai Peninsula we should enumerate the following:
– the overthrow of Muammar al-Gaddafi which affected the intensification 
of the flow of forces and means from Libya to the Sinai Peninsula;
– the release of jihadists from Egyptian prisons by the transitional military 
government;
– relations between the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula;
course and consequences.] In: Szczepankiewicz-Rudzka, E. Arabska wiosna w Afryce 
Północnej: przyczyny, przebieg, skutki. [The Arab Spring in North Africa: causes, course, 
consequences.] Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka.
9 Awad, M., Tadros, S., op. cit., p. 3.
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– cutting off smuggling routes from the Gaza Strip by the administration of 
Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi, which reduces the traditional Bedouin sources of 
income;
– the proliferation of jihadism ideology on the regional and global scale, 
including the activities of the Islamic State.
THE REBELLION OF ANSAR BAYT AL-MAQDIS
According to local sources, in 2011 a group of Palestinian jihadists joined 
TSJ establishing Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (Supporters of Jerusalem, Anṣār Bayt 
al-Maqdis – ABM). An emir of TSJ was Palestinian Hasham al-Saedi, who 
had fought in the ranks of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and then in the Islamic 
State of Iraq – (ISI). The creation of the group was directly inspired by the 
organisational activity of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq10, showing a number 
of similarities, also in the ideological dimension11. Drawing inspiration from 
Al-Zarqawi’s activity, the leader transformed the ideological movement into 
an organised structure consisting of many cells. At that time the organisa-
tion maintained a close relationship with the Mujahedeen Shura Council of 
Jerusalem (Majlis Shura al-Mujahedeen fi Aknaf Bayt al-Maqdis), operation in 
the Gaza Strip. Just like other groups coming from the Sinai Peninsula, the 
Mujahedeen Shura Council wanted to weaken Hamas, accusing militants of 
this group of conspiring against Salafism12.
Thus, the group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis was created in 2011 after the over-
throw of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. The dictator ruled Egypt from 
1981, creating an authoritarian political system that functioned with minor 
changes until early 201113. As a result of protests, the leader decided not to 
apply for another term in the presidential election and power was taken by 
Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Armed 
10 The founder and leader of an organisation called Jamaat al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad (JTWJ) 
which later turned into al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).
11 Azoulay, R. 2015. Islamic State franchising. Tribes, transnational jihadi networks and 
generational shifts. CRU report. Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clin-
gendael, Available at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Rivka-Azoulay_Islamic_
State_expansion_CRU_April2015.pdf, pp. 24–25.
12 Ibidem, p. 25.
13 See Lipa, M. 2013. Autorytaryzm na arabskim Bliskim Wschodzie: Egipt w latach 
1981–2010. [Authoritarianism in the Arab Middle East: Egypt in the years 1981–2010.] 
Warszawa: Askon, Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Kultur Śródziemnomorskich 
i Orientalnych.
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Forces. In 2012 Muhammad Mursi became the first democratically elected 
president in the history of the state. The new leader increased his preroga-
tives by means of decrees, which triggered another wave of protests, as the 
result of which the newly elected president was overthrown in July 2013. As 
a result of the coup, the military took power under the leadership of General 
Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, who 
appointed Adli Mahmud Mansur for a temporary president of the country. In 
the face of these events, the former president, Muhammad Mursi, connected 
with the Muslim Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), 
which in June 2013 with other parties formed the coalition National Alliance 
Supporting Legitimacy (NASL), called for a boycott of the government14. On 
the other hand, a large part of Egyptian society supported president As-Sisi, 
due to the economic recovery and the growing concerns about the increasing 
influence of extremist circles. Fearing worsening of the situation, a part of 
society accepts the limitation of rights and freedoms, and the militarisation 
of state structures.
The re-growth of violence in the Sinai Peninsula occurred after the 
overthrow of Muhammad Mursi in July 2013. Removal from office of the 
president connected with the Muslim Brotherhood contributed to the inten-
sification of terrorist activity in the Sinai Peninsula. Since then, ABM and 
later Sinai Province have regularly admitted to the majority of the attacks 
targeting the military, police and other state structures in Egypt. Jihadists 
claim that this is the answer to the repression against Islamists and support-
ers of the president deposed by the army. In spite of the fact that Egyptian 
jihadists have not been enthusiastic about the political activity of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, equating it with democracy and nationalism, the removal from 
power of President Mursi gave them the opportunity to rebuild a networks 
of influence. Since then, ABM has expanded its attacks outside the Sinai 
Peninsula, including the capital of Egypt. Since 2013, in addition to direct 
attacks on Israel object in Egypt, including energy infrastructure, the group 
has expanded its attacks on the ‘close enemy’ – the apostate Egyptian regime. 
In order to project power outside the Sinai Peninsula, the subsidiary of IS 
must use operating forces of groups from the Nile Valley, but many of them 
remain connected with al-Qaeda.
The fight of the government with Islamists often causes death and destruc-
tion of civilian property. An example of this is the creation of a buffer zone 
near the border with the Gaza Strip, as a result of which houses of residents 
14 In the second half of 2014 both the FJP and NASL were made illegal.
Jihadism expansion in Egypt after 2011 on the example of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, Sinai Province… 217
of Rafah were demolished, which was motivated by the fight against terror-
ism. The tribal society perceived it as a form of collective punishment, which 
deepened the aversion to the central government. Finally, in April 2014 the 
Egyptian government officially recognised Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis as a terrorist 
organisation15.
A PROVINCE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE IN THE SINAI PENINSULA
The Sinai Peninsula, which is part of Egypt, is administratively divided 
into two provinces (Matrouh Governorates): North Sinai and South Sinai. 
Due to its geopolitical importance, this territory was a battleground for each 
war between Egypt and Israel from 1948 to 1979. The territory was demilita-
rised after these states signed the peace treaty in 1979. For this reason, the 
Egyptian armed forces did not fully control this area.
The strategic importance of the Sinai Peninsula, mainly due to the border 
with Israel, had already been noticed by al-Qaeda, whose subsidiaries con-
ducted their operations in the area. The peninsula also became a foothold 
for the activities of jihadists from Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis. Despite the lack of 
official oath of allegiance, the group seemed to have strong links with the 
network of al-Qaeda, whose leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in official statements 
presented sympathy for the leadership of ABM. Despite this, in 2014 the 
organisation formalised relations with the Islamic State16 (IS), thus ending 
its informal cooperation with al-Qaeda. In November 2013, this group, with 
the help of Twitter, swore bay’ah (oath of allegiance) to the leader of the 
Islamic State – Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi17. Since that moment the organisation 
has used the name Wilayat Sinai, that is Sinai Province. It is also active in the 
territories bordering Israel and the Gaza Strip18.
15 Fahim, K., Thomas, M. 2014. Egypt flattens neighborhoods to create buffer zone 
along Gaza border. The New York Times 30 October 2014, p. A8; Taha, H., op. cit. In: 
Hokayem, E., Taha, H. eds., op. cit., pp. 183–186.
16 The Islamic State (IS) is a jihadist structure established on 29 June 2014 after the 
announcement of the creation of a self-styled caliphate. Its predecessor is the Islamic 
State of Iraq (ISI) and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), although the 
abbreviation ISIS is used in parallel, which is the acronym for the above-quoted name.
17 Kirkpatrick, D. D. 2016. Militant group in Egypt vows loyalty to ISIS. The New York 
Times 11 November 2014, p. A1.
18 Israel and Islamic State. The caliphate eyes the Holy Land. The Economist 23 January 
2016.
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The choice of IS could be associated with the genesis of the creation of 
ABM, inspired by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s activity. After the death of the 
leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, in June 2006, which occurred as a result of US 
bombing, Egyptian Abu Hamza al-Muhajir took over the leadership. The 
Jihadist known as Abu Ayyub al-Masri, a close associate of al-Zarqawi, is 
considered one of the founders of the structure now referred to as the Islamic 
State19. Other leaders at the highest level and founders of ABM were also 
veterans of combats in Iraq, for example, Tawfiq Mohammed Faraj20.
Also other factors contributed to the official association with the Islamic 
State. Firstly, as a result of the developing Syrian crisis and the fight against 
Islamism in Egypt, hundreds of people emigrated to Syria, where they came 
in contact with the ideology and practices of the Islamic State. According 
to some estimates, several thousand Egyptian militants fight in the ranks 
of IS. Secondly, due to the crisis in Libya the smuggling of weapons and 
fighters influx into Egypt became possible, which allowed for co-operation 
between jihadist groups, including in training of new fighters. Thirdly, the 
losses among executives also led to the oath to IS. Tawfiq Mohammad Faraj 
was killed as a result of fights with the Egyptian security forces between 
March and October 201421. Therefore, it is possible that ABM swore alle-
giance to the Islamic State because of significant losses suffered as a result 
of the campaign conducted by the Egyptian armed forces, as well as because 
the operation of the group required both financial and operational support. 
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis might have declared loyalty to the Islamic State also 
due to a desire to intensify the recruitment and strengthen the zeal to fight 
with the Egyptian army by referring to the success of IS in Iraq and Syria.
Whatever the motivation, the oath of allegiance to Islamic State divided 
ABM into two camps: the one which approved it and the other which negated 
the loyalty to the self-proclaimed caliphate. A considerable part of groups 
belonging to the latter camp, operating in the Nile Valley, support al-Qaeda, 
despite the lack of official affiliation to this global network. Therefore, the 
declaration of allegiance to IS contributed to an internal split, which initially 
– at the turn of 2014 and 2015 – weakened the operational ability of the 
Egyptian jihadist environment.
19 The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. 2014. ISIS: Portrait 
of a  jihadi terrorist organisation. Available at: http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/
articles/Art_20733/101_14_Ef_1329270214.pdf, p. 25.
20 Azoulay, R. op. cit., p. 26.
21 Ibidem.
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Despite the initial crisis, since swearing the oath to the Islamic State 
Egyptian jihadists have successfully continued attacks against the state admin-
istration. On 29 January 2015 they carried out a series of deadly bombings, 
mortar attacks and ambushes on objects and military and police officers in 
North Sinai. At least 40 people, including civilians were killed, and more than 
100 injured in them22.
Sinai Province claimed responsibility for numerous attacks on objects of 
the security forces. Among them there were: a successful missile attack on 
an Egyptian patrol boat in July 2015 or the execution of a Croatian engineer 
working in Egypt, Tomislav Salopek, kidnapped in July 201523. IS militants 
from the Sinai Peninsula also claimed responsibility for a bomb attack on 
a Russian aircraft Boeing A321 in Egypt which took place on 31 October. 
2015. This attack by IS supporters resulted in the highest number of casual-
ties, next to suicide attacks on mosques al-Badr and al-Hashoosh in Yemen 
on 20 March 2015 and a series of suicide bombings and shootings in Paris on 
13 November 201524.
Table 2
The list of terrorist attacks carried out by ABM/IS in 2015 on the territory of Egypt
Date Place Number of victims
24 November 2015 Al-Arish, North Sinai; attack on the hotel Swiss Inn Resort
at least 7 people 
killed
and 10 injured
4 November 2015 Al-Arish, the Sinai Peninsula; suicide bombing
at least 4 people 
killed
and 10 injured
31 October 2015 The Sinai Peninsula; bomb explosion in the Russian plane Boeing A321 224 people killed
11 September 2015 Rafah, the Sinai Peninsula; bomb attack 2 people killed
22 Eleiba, A. 2015. Security imperatives in Sinai. Al-Ahram Weekly, no. 1232 5 February 
2015. Available at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/10333/17/Security-imperatives-in-
Sinai.aspx [Accessed: 20 September 2015].
23 The kidnapping was probably not carried out by Sinai Province. The employee was 
abducted by a criminal group which demanded a ransom, then transferred the prisoner 
to the IS subsidiary. Therefore, from the operational point of view, this event should 
not be seen as evidence of the increased presence of Sinai Province in Greater Cairo.
24 Kalfood, M.A., Fahim, K., Schmitt, E. 2014. Militants linked to ISIS say they killed 
Yemenis. The New York Times 21 March 2014, p. A1.
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Date Place Number of victims
26 August 2015 The Sinai Peninsula; attack on police officers near Al-Arish
2 people killed
about 16 injured
12 August 2015
Decapitation of the Croatian employee 
– Tomislav Salopek because of 
Croatia’s participation in the war with 
the Islamic State
1 person killed
11 July 2015 Cairo; explosion of a bomb in a car near the Italian consulate
1 person killed
4 injured
1–2 July 2015
North Sinai; attacks on checkpoints 
and police stations around the city of 
Sheikh Zuweid in North Sinai
21 people killed
9 injured
29 June 2015
Cairo; assassination of Hisham 
Barakat, Egyptian Attorney General, 
by the detonation of a remote 
controlled car bomb
1 person killed
4 injured
12 April 2015 North Sinai; attack on an armoured vehicle near the Sheikh Zuweid
6 soldiers killed
2 injured
12 April 2015 Al-Arish, North Sinai; bomb attack at a police station in Al-Arish
8 people killed
45 injured
Source: own study on the basis of media reports.
The attack on the Russian plane, carrying mostly tourists, shows that 
Egyptian jihadists pose a threat not only to the authorities they try to over-
throw, but also to the international community. Despite such a spectacu-
lar attack, the tactical nature of the operation remains constant, as well as 
the targets, which for the most part are stationary checkpoints, patrols and 
convoys. Also, the preferred methods of attack are invariable. Jihadists use 
improvised explosive devices, mortars and guns. However, two particular 
trends become visible. The first is the intensification of attacks targeted at 
a group of private residences, using explosives and arson, though they are 
mainly directed at the security officials. The other is the increased use of 
anti-armour guided missiles.
Despite the fact that Sinai Province, created after swearing the oath of 
allegiance by Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis to the Islamic State, is the most active 
armed group in Egypt, the Egyptian government’s counterterrorism campaign 
focuses on the Muslim Brotherhood which appears as the ‘organisation-brain’ 
of all terrorist activities. The government recognises the combat with the 
Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters as a way to eliminate terrorism and 
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ensure security and stability in Egypt25. However, the growth of influence 
of IS has contributed to the justification by the Egyptian authorities of both 
militarisation of state structures and fight with other structures which link 
their activities with Sinai Province. Through such activities As-Sisi creates 
the image of Egypt as an important ally in the fight against global jihadist 
movement. The leader says that the international coalition should direct its 
operations also against other Islamic extremists, led by the Muslim Brother-
hood, thus seeking to legitimise operations against the opposition. The lack 
of a differentiated approach to the Islamist opposition increases the likeli-
hood of radicalisation of subsequent structures excluded from the entirety of 
political life26.
THE SOLDIERS OF EGYPT (AJNAD MISR)
AND THE POPULAR RESISTANCE MOVEMENT
(AL-’IQAB AL-THAWRI)
Despite the largest operational capabilities, Sinai Province is not the 
only jihadi structure functioning in Egypt. New armed groups opposing state 
structures are also formed.
At the end of 2013 a former member of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis – Humam 
Muhammed, known as Maged al-Din al-Masry, founded the group Soldiers of 
Egypt (Ajnad Misr). The group officially announced its formation in January 
2014, and in May the Egyptian government officially recognised it as a terror-
ist organisation. The structure of the group is still not well know. However, 
the assassination of its leader, Hammam Attiyah, in April 2015 pushed Ajnad 
Misr in the direction of al-Qaeda. Some representatives of the security serv-
ices define the group as an armed wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, although 
evidence for such an association is insufficient27. The organisation carries 
out attacks mainly in and around the agglomeration of Cairo, where terror-
ist attacks have become part of everyday life of the residents. ABM/Sinai 
Province refers to the Soldiers of Egypt as ‘brothers’, but relations between 
the two structures are not well known either. Both groups attack state infra-
structure, however, Sinai Province attacks primarily the armed forces, and 
25 See Burgrova, H. 2016. Insecurity in Sinai and beyond. Why the Egyptian counterter-
rorism strategy is failing. DGAP Kompakt, no. 1. Available at: https://dgap.org/en/
article/getFullPDF/27538 [Accessed: 02 February 2016].
26 Taha, H., op. cit. In: Hokayem, E., Taha, H. eds., op. cit., pp. 193–194.
27 Ibidem, pp. 187–188.
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Ajnad Misr focuses on the police structures, most likely due to the lack of 
operational capabilities28.
Another structure was established in January 2015 as a result of the 
merger of five entities which formed the Allied Popular Resistance Move-
ment (APRM), composed of the Popular Resistance Movement (PRM), 
the Determination Movement, the Revolutionary Punishment Movement 
(RPM), Beni Suef Revolutionaries and the Execution Battalion. Despite the 
unification in the APRM, the level of autonomy of the individual structures 
is not clear. The RPM is the most organised of the above mentioned enti-
ties. Although the date of the creation of the group has not been specified, 
it conducted its first officially confirmed attack in February 2015. Since then, 
the group has carried out a series of attacks in many provinces. The militants 
direct most of their claims to the security personnel, government and private 
entrepreneurs affiliated with the authorities29.
Ideologically the APRM focuses on revenge for the suppression of the 
revolution. The coalition directed its early action against the security forces. 
Only in mid-2015 a shift towards more diversified activities became visible. 
The group takes over the methods of operation of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, 
although it is uncertain whether this represents a real ideological change or 
a measure aimed at attracting new members and funds.
SUMMARY
In the nineties of the twentieth century Egypt fought with a wave of 
terrorism and bombings carried out by jihadi organisations. With the begin-
ning of the new millennium, this wave weakened, although in 2004–2006 
spectacular terrorist attacks occurred. However, the ‘Arab Spring’ led to the 
destabilisation of Egypt and brought a new wave of terrorism, much more 
extreme than the previous one. In the past four years endemic problems have 
grown, and sporadic terrorist incidents have evolved into a rebellion.
The scale of the links built by the Islamic State in Egypt results from 
the relative proximity in relation to its territorial units in Iraq and Syria. In 
addition to the Libyan cells, Sinai Province seems to be the most developing 
28 Ibidem, pp. 186–187; Barnett, D. 2014. Ajnad Misr, Egypt’s latest jihadist group. 
Long War Journal 2 February 2014. Available at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/
archives/2014/02/ ajnad_misr_egypts_latest_jihad.php [Accessed: 20 October 2015].
29 The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy. 2015. Egypt’s rising security threat. Available at: 
http://timep.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Tahrir_Report_FINAL_WEB.pdf, p. 26.
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branch. However, it should not be overestimated, because its structures are 
not as advanced as those created in Mesopotamia, although certainly jihadists 
of IS are able to carry out effective terrorist attacks, which is confirmed by 
numerous aforementioned cases. With weak state control, marginalisation 
of tribal communities and rooted jihadist activism, Sinai Province seems to 
have a relatively large impact on the change of the local dynamics. Since its 
inception it has intensified its activities and generated new challenges to the 
security of Egypt, though we must not forget that next to this structure other 
extremist groups operate.
The main challenge for President Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi and the Egyptian 
security forces is the restoration of the stability of the state. The expansion of 
jihadism and an increase in the number of terrorist attacks, mainly in North 
Sinai, but also in other parts of the state prove that Egypt will have to fight 
a long war of attrition against Islamist and jihadist groups in order to achieve 
this goal.
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JIHADISM EXPANSION IN EGYPT AFTER 2011 ON THE EXAMPLE
OF ANSAR BAYT AL-MAQDIS, SINAI PROVINCE AND OTHER 
STRUCTURES
Summary
Since the ‘January 25 Revolution’ the Egyptian territory has become 
a subject of increased interest of various jihadist structures. The Sinai Penin-
sula plays a special role in their development as it is an area of strategic 
importance because of its proximity to Israel and Cairo, one of the centers of 
the Arab world. Among such structures there is Sinai Province, which is a rel-
atively new player on the scene of the Egyptian political violence, although 
now this entity has the greatest influence on this territory. The group derives 
from Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, a group that appeared in the northern part of the 
Sinai Peninsula in 2011. In 2013 it transformed into a branch of the Islamic 
State. Despite significant operational capabilities, Sinai Province is not the 
only jihadi structure functioning in Egypt. New armed groups opposed to 
state structures are formed, which include Ajnad Misr or the Allied Popular 
Resistance Movement. The article aims to present the process of jihadism 
expansion in Egypt after 2011, tying it with destabilisation of the state’s 
internal structures, reflected by frequent changes of authorities.
EKSPANSJA DŻIHADYZMU W EGIPCIE PO 2011 ROKU,
NA PRZYKŁADZIE DZIAŁALNOŚCI ANSAR BAJT AL-MAKDIS,
PROWINCJI SYNAJ ORAZ INNYCH STRUKTUR
Streszczenie
Od „rewolucji 25 stycznia 2011 r.” egipskie terytorium w zwiększonym 
stopniu stało się przedmiotem zainteresowania dżihadystów z różnych struk-
tur. Szczególną rolę w ich rozwoju pełni Półwysep Synaj, będący obszarem 
o  znaczeniu strategicznym, ze względu na bliskość Izraela oraz Kairu, jed-
nego z centrów świata arabskiego. Pośród tego rodzaju struktur znajduje się 
Prowincja Synaj, która jest stosunkowo nowym graczem na egipskiej scenie 
przemocy na tle politycznym, choć obecnie to właśnie ten podmiot posia-
da największe wpływy na tym terytorium. Grupa wywodzi się z Ansar Bajt 
al-Makdis, ugrupowania, które pojawiło się w północnej części Półwyspu 
MARTA STEMPIEŃ226
Synaj w 2011 r., w 2013 r. przekształcając się w filię Państwa Islamskiego. 
Pomimo znacznych możliwości operacyjnych, Prowincja Synaj nie jest jedyną 
strukturą dżihadystyczną funkcjonującą w Egipcie. Powstają również nowe 
zbrojne ugrupowania, przeciwstawiające się strukturom państwowym, do któ-
rych należą Żołnierze Egiptu czy Zjednoczony Ludowy Ruch Oporu. Artykuł 
ma na celu przedstawienie przebiegu ekspansji dżihadyzmu w Egipcie po 
2011 r., wiążąc ten proces z destabilizacją struktur wewnętrznych państwa, 
przejawiającą się m.in. w częstych zmianach władz.
ЭКСПАНСИЯ ДЖИХАДИЗМА В ЕГИПТЕ ПОСЛЕ 2011 ГОДА
– НА ПРИМЕРЕ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ «АНСАР БЕЙТ АЛЬ-МАКДИС»,
«ПРОВИНЦИЯ СИНАЙ» И ДРУГИХ ГРУППИРОВОК
Резюме
Со времени «революции 25 января 2011 года» территория Египта стала 
в повышенной степени предметом заинтересованности со стороны джиха-
дистов, образующих различные группировки. Особую роль в их развитии 
выполняет Синайский полуостров, являющийся районом стратегического 
значения из-за близости Израиля и Каира, одного из центров арабского мира. 
К подобным группировкам относится «Провинция Синай», которая является 
относительно новым игроком на египетской сцене насилия на политической 
почве, хотя в настоящее время именно этот субъект обладает наибольшим 
влиянием на данной территории. Группа берёт своё начало от «Ансар Бейт 
Аль-Макдис» – группировки, которая появилась в Северной части Синайс-
кого полуострова в 2011 году, а в 2013 году была преобразована в филиал 
Исламского государства. Несмотря на значительные оперативные возможнос-
ти, «Провинция Синай» не является единственной группировкой джихадис-
тов, функционирующей в Египте. Формируются также новые вооружённые 
группировки, противопоставляющие себя государственным структурам, 
к которым можно отнести Солдат Египта или Объединённое Народное Дви-
жение Сопротивления. Цель данной статьи – представить процесс экспансии 
джихадизма в Египте после 2011 года, показывая его связь с дестабилизацией 
внутренних государственных структур, которая проявляется, в частности, 
в частой смене власти.
